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TEMAS DE ONTOLOGÍA SOCIAL: CONVENCIONES, NORMAS E INSTITUCIONES EN LA FILOSOFÍA DE LAS CIENCIAS SOCIALES

Curso 2020/2021/Subject's code30001291

TEMAS DE ONTOLOGÍA SOCIAL: CONVENCIONES, NORMAS E INSTITUCIONES EN LA FILOSOFÍA DE LAS CIENCIAS SOCIALES

BIBLIOGRAFÍA COMPLEMENTARIA

ISBN(13): 9780199679676
Título: GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS
Autor/es: Philip Pettit ; Christian List ;
Editorial: : OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Bibliografía ampliada:

 

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Bicchieri, C. (2014). Norms, conventions, and the power of expectations. In N. Cartwright & E. Montuschi (Eds.), Philosophy of social science: A new introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 208-229.

Bicchieri, C. (2006). The Grammar of Society. The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. NY: Cambridge University Press.  Capítulo 1.

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González de Prado Salas, J., & Zamora-Bonilla, J. (2015). Collective actors without collective minds: an inferentialist approach. Philosophy of the Social Sciences45(1), 3-25.

Guala, F. (2007). The Philosophy of Social Science: Metaphysical and Empirical. Philosophy Compass 2, 954-980. (Sección 2).

Guala, F., & Hindriks, F. (2014). A unified social ontology. The Philosophical Quarterly65(259), 177-201.

Searle, J. R. (1990). Collective intentions and actions. Intentions in communication401, 401.

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Searle, J. R. (2015). Status functions and institutional facts: reply to Hindriks and Guala. Journal of Institutional Economics11(3), 507-514.

Sunstein, C. R. (2000). Deliberative trouble? Why groups go to extremes. The Yale Law Journal110(1), 71-119.

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Tomasello, M., & Rakoczy, H. (2003). What makes human cognition unique? From individual to shared to collective intentionality. Mind & Language18(2), 121-147.